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Foreword 
The mission of the Secretariat for Institutional Support for Economic Research in Africa 
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SISERA's main objectives is to help improve upon the dissemination of research results of 
African centres. 
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output of SISERA's Partner Institutions, which are African research centres that have 
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Manuscripts of Partner Institutions are published with their authorization. 
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What is the Optimal Level of Tariffs for African Countries? 
Abstract: 
Economic theory suggests that a small open economy cannot influence world prices and 
that the optimal tariff for such a country is zero. Michael Mussa (former IMF Research Director) 
argues that, "practical and political considerations make this impractical. We can therefore 
assume that tariffs rates will be positive for purpoes of domestic protection and to generate fiscal 
revenues". According to the Sachs and Warner index of openness, the benchmark tariff 
considered 'distorting' is tariff rates above 40, while below 40 are considered 'less distorting'. But 
much of policy recommendations, including the UEMOA and Ghana rates for the ECOWAS 
common external tariffs (CET) range between zero and 25. For many countries, rates ranging 
between 20- 40; or 0 - 15; or 5 --20; etc are suggested. There is a key question as to what 
determines the 'optimal tariff rates for African countries. Given that the tide of global trade 
liberalization caught Africa looking for trade policy anchors on almost every side, answers to this 
question become highly important for structuring trade policies for maximum gains from trade 
liberalization. In answering the question, this work traces the economic underpinning to tariff 
formation and the implications of different tariff rates. The study was however unable to pin down 
any number as the optimal tariff rate. Rather, it posits that there is no magic formula to determine the 
appropriate level of tariff pertinent to the implementation of a medium- term growth strategy in sub- 
Saharan Africa, and that ultimately the particular circumstances of each country will determine the 
structure of tariff rates. It noted that the particular tariff rate that maximizes economic welfare for 
any developing country has to be one that takes into account the peculiar economic circumstances, 
the institutional structures available for trade liberalization and the complementary instruments for 
trade and growth facilitation. In the latter group, port reforms and domestic infrastructure for 
production are very important. The study therefore suggests a country by country approach to tariff 
prescription and due consideration to level of economic development and structure of production in 
the implementation of any given tariff rate. 
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1. Introduction: 
For many countries of Africa, the issue is no longer whether or not to liberalize trade, or 
whether trade and outward orientation matter for growth. A number of African countries are 
already signatories to binding and enforceable liberalization protocols under the WTO and other 
international trade pacts. (Soludo, 1997; 1998: 279). Trade liberalization and regional integration 
agreements are now widely accepted in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Many have eliminated 
quantitative restrictions (QR's) and reduced tariffs from triple-digit levels to the range of 15% — 
30%. 
However, modern authors, eager to hasten the process of trade liberalization in developing 
countries recommend 'optimal tariff rates' to accelerate growth and reduce distortions in 
liberalizing economies. According to Rodrik (1998:184) "There is actually a fair bit of consensus 
on what constitutes a reasonable trade strategy for countries of Africa. The consensus can be 
crudely expressed in terms of a number of do's and don'ts: de-monopolize trade; streamline the 
import regime, reduce red tape and implement transparent customs procedures; replace 
quantitative restrictions with tariffs; avoid extreme variation in tariff rates and excessively high 
rates of effective protection; allow exporters duty-free access to imported inputs; refrain from 
large doses of anti-export bias; do not tax exports too highly. Not only is there wide agreement on 
these policies, there is also less dissent than might appear at first sight on what is to be considered 
"extreme" or "too high". While the dominant consensus is that ultimately a more liberal trade 
regime is beneficial to all countries, there are raging debates about the process, speed, and 
sequencing of liberalization in different countries with different initial conditions and varying 
external environment: what to liberalize, when and hp? And what supplementary or 
complementary measures should precede or accompany liberalization?" The lack of consensus on 
the required level of protection and procedures for liberalization leads to dramatically different 
policy prescriptions and raises questions about the optimality of agreed tariff levels following 
trade liberalization agreements in a regional integration arrangement and whether these actually 
maximize welfare. 
Indeed, the relationship between extent of liberalization and direction of imports and 
growth for many countries of SSA is not clearly defined. Mukhopadhyay (1998) argues that 
greater liberalization of imports in a Sub-Saharan African country could lead to more significant 
decline in its rate of growth due to the recession in high-income economies. This was the case in 
the early 1990's. Furthermore, a rise in real imports may be beneficial for the country if the 
composition of imports is aimed at raising domestic output, and is efficiency-improving. This 
case was made by Rodrik (2000:17) "In practice, the most compelling mechanism that links trade 
with growth in developing countries is that imported capital goods are likely to be significantly 
cheaper than those manufactured at home. Policies that restrict imports of capital equipment, 
raise the price of capital goods at home, and thereby reduce real investment levels have to be 
viewed as undesirable prima facie". On the other hand, many units of manufacturing sector were 
devastated by import competition owing to the fact that rapid liberalization could not stimulate 
them to reach the world levels within the time frame with relatively low investment. These 
industries came under considerable pressure from cheap imports. If as Mosely and Weeks (1993) 
pointed out, already many African countries were involved in bilateral and/or multilateral 
arrangements, the question rages as to the optimal level of tariffs that these regional integration 
arrangements should have in order to maximize the welfare of the member states. Answers to 
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these questions go to determine not just the economic attractiveness but also the sustainability of 
regional integration arrangements in the region. 
2. Regionalism and Determination of level of Tariffs in Africa 
In one respect, the structure of trade and regional alliance in Africa confirms the postulation 
of literature that countries tend to form trade agreements with other countries in the same region 
rather than with more distant nations. In figure 1 in the appendix, we present a summary view of 
the regional integration arrangements in Africa. Members are geographically closer to one 
another. Wider evidence that trade blocs are predominantly regional is provided by WTO (2000), 
in a report titled "Mapping of Regional Trade Agreements", in which each of the 150 agreements 
notified to the WTO is represented in map form. It shows that member countries tend to be 
geographically close in the majority of cases (Zissimos, 2001). It has been argued that it is 
natural for trade blocs to exist between countries that are close if distance makes inter-regional 
trade uneconomical. Using a gravity model, Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995) show empirically that 
countries behave preferentially towards trade with close countries. This new economic geography 
(NEG) model was developed by Krugman (1991) with the goal of explaining sustainable income 
differences between regions or countries (Puga and Ottaviano, 1998). 
In other cases, however, African integration arrangements have not been known to follow 
theoretical postulations. In the literature for example, the forces driving regionalism include 
positive externalities, which emerge where industries and firms cluster together and the relative 
importance of externalities matters more than trade barriers. In such cases, falling trade costs 
make sustainable core-periphery equilibrium more likely. Part of the implication of the above is 
that regional integration arrangements are supposed to be demand-driven and the tariffs 
determined on the basis of the relative needs of industries and firms in the countries making up 
the region. This has not been known to be so in Africa. First, most of the regional integration 
arrangements are not demand driven. The consideration of proximity and relative bargaining 
power in the world trading system seems to crowd out domestic economic considerations 
especially in the setting of the tariff rates for the countries in the region (or in the integrating 
exercise). 
Indeed, the challenge is to examine the extent to which regional integration arrangements 
have truly fostered economic transformation of developing nations in Africa. What are the 
mechanisms for setting tariff rates in African regional integration arrangements and what are the 
impacts of these on the economic welfare of participating countries? Is there truly a tariff level 
that can maximize welfare in Africa especially in the context of a regional agreement? 
An examination of existing regional integration arrangements in Africa shows that little 
considerations have been given to domestic economic environments while determining regional 
tariff rates. For example, the UEMOA CET, which ECO WAS countries are considering to adopt 
for the region, consists of simplified tariff structure with four bands: 0 per cent for medicines, 
medical equipment, newspapers and books; 5 percent for capital goods and raw materials; 10 
percent for intermediate goods and other inputs; and 20 percent for finished consumer goods. In 
addition, there is a Statistical levy of 1 percent on all goods including those exempt from duty 
and a Community Solidarity Tax of 0.5 percent for compensating for loss of customs revenue and 
for the financing of the operations of UEMOA. However, for a country like Nigeria whose 
-2- 
current tariff structure features a tariff range- 0-- 150%, an unweighted average of 27% (weighted 
average of about 20%), 19 tariff bands, a standard deviation of 19.8 and a coefficient of variation 
of 70.7, harmonization could be difficult. Besides, the country depends on tariff revenue for 
about 13%. This is besides the growing public leaning towards believing that the woes of the real 
sector is to be blamed on the indiscriminate dumping of cheap goods in the country. Besides, the 
compliance rate in the 8 UEMOA countries that are currently applying the rates is quite low. As 
such, both the desirability and relative effectiveness of the four bands compared to any other 
bands, in meeting the revenue and real sector needs of the economies under consideration are in 
question. 
This could in part explain the slow pace of a number of the regional integration efforts in 
the region. The use of some magical numbers that hardly took into consideration the level of 
economic development of the countries involved, the loss in government revenue, and the 
balance of payments position of the countries is to be mild, not workable. On many occasions, 
the countries are simply bludgeoned into accepting the rates (alongside the possible 
consequences). Thus, while they sign on to the arrangements to take the rates, policymakers in 
the many of these developing countries do not implement them as the force of domestic political 
and economic expediency crowds out the regional goals. 
The situation is much the same in the Central African Economic and Monetary 
Community. Much remained to be done to implement fully the goal of a single market in the 
region. The member countries recently took a decision to further liberalize trade through a 
simplification of the structure of the common external tariff and a reduction of average tariff 
rates. Meanwhile the extent of implementation of the agreements already reached is still low and 
problematic and countries in the region are often blamed for putting sectoral and national goals 
above the regional integration goals. Slow trade and monetary reforms continue to make the 
implementation of common external tariffs cumbersome 
What is more? There is currently a proliferation of regional integration arrangements with 
little effectiveness in any region. The diagram (Figure 1 in the appendix) shows that each 
regional integration arrangement enjoys multiple memberships by countries also belonging to 
other regional integration arrangements. This is often the case and countries join these 
arrangements without prejudice to their faithfulness to the protocols of other arrangements to 
which they also belong. 
3. Theoretical Overview: The Economics of Optimal Tariffs 
Discussions on the optimality or otherwise of any tariff structure necessarily have to deal 
with the reasons for the imposition of tariffs in the first place. From protection of infant industries 
to raising revenue for government, imposition of tariffs aims to increase domestic welfare and 
reduce distortions arising from differential production structure and costs between the imposing 
country and its trading partners. But often, the aims of maximizing revenue may conflict with the 
objectives of infant industry protection. Particularly in the age of global trade liberalization, most 
developing countries face the challenge of not only harmonizing their tariff structures but also 
bringing these to maximize domestic welfare — production, consumption and revenue objectives 
of both the government and entire economy. Thus, in the literature, much of the debate aims to 
resolve the question of the structure of such tariff. While there are arguments in favor of one 
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tariff structure, there are others insisting on differentiated tariff structure for the different 
industries? 
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Box 1: Theoretical Derivation of the Optimal Tariff 
How is the optimal tariff derived? Figure 2 in the appendix is a presentation of the optimal tariff argument in tenns of 
the simple textbook model of monopsony and illustrates the trade-off between gains and losses in arriving at the optimal tariff. 
Let us look at the tariff policy of a large country, which by virtue of its size can influence the world price of product. 
Following Serventer, 2001, a hypothetical example is the US's import demand and the rest of the world's export supply curve 
for cars. The US is a large purchaser of foreign cars (a monopsonistic buyer) that a reduction in US imports will cause a 
decline in international prices. 
The DD curve is the country's demand curve for imports; the foreign supply curve is upward-sloping because the 
country is large (foreign producers export more only if higher price is offered), the SS curve represents the MCM curve for 
foreign exporters and tells us what the home country must pay for each unit it imports; because the cost to the economy of an 
extra unit of import includes not only the price of the marginal unit but also the added cost of paying for the inframarginal 
units because their price rises with the price of the marginal unit). This marginal cost-of-import curve is shown as MCM. 
In a free-trade situation, world equilibrium is at the point E, where the domestic demand curve and the foreign supply 
curve intersect, giving price PF and quantity imported MF. However, point PF the value to the home country of an extra unit of 
imports is less than the marginal cost of that unit (by an amount EF). The home country can therefore increase its welfare by 
reducing imports to level MT, determined by the point of intersection (A) of the demand curve and MCM; the resulting gain is 
equal to area FAE. This gain has come about because the home country's restriction of import demand has reduced the 
equilibrium relative price at which it buys imports — that is its terms of trade has improved, P denotes the new world relative 
price of imports. This is the so-called terms of trade argument for protection. 
At the heart of the problem is the notion that a country with monopsony power in world trade can improve its welfare 
with trade restrictions. A country, which is a monopsonist gains by reducing its demand for a good, thereby forcing down its 
price. Import restriction is not realized without government intervention because the agents of the economy are too small to 
exercise any monopsony power. In the real world market forces are not the determining factor as there are varying doses of 
government interventions. Perhaps the most important form of government intervention in international trade is the growing 
phenomenon whereby governments double as salesmen for their firms. In the words of Markusen and Venables, (1995), 
"Trade policy involves countries acting as agents in support of national champions competing with the champions of foreign 
countries in the international market place". Governments of nations generally maintain distortions in the pattern of trade for 
reasons they consider more valid than the economists' criterion of efficiency. Trade among nations is fraught with differing 
shades of protectionism and there is not a single country that did not employ vigorous protection at some stage in its history. 
The government can move the economy from the sub-optimal free-trade point E to the optimal point A by imposing a trade- 
restricting policy such as a tariff. A tariff of AB per unit will shift the demand curve for imports down to TT, and equilibrium 
in the world market will be realized at B with world price Pw and domestic price P1. The tariff of PWPT per unit is termed the 
optimal tariff 
Although a large country can secure improved terms of trade by imposing a tariff, it does so at the cost of increased 
domestic deadweight losses. A tariff that raises the local price of an imported goods reduces its excess demand in the world 
market and thereby causes the intervening country's terms of trade to improve — of course, at the cost of a shrinkage in its 
import volume. Because of this trade-off, it does not pay a country to increase its tariff indefinitely (see Serventer, 2001:3-7). 
An optimal tariff balances these opposing effects and, as is well known, is inversely related to the rest of the rest of the 
world's price elasticity of import demand for the intervening country's exports (Syropoulos, 2002). 
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Two effects are illustrated in the figure: Relative to free trade, domestic consumers lose the area PTAEPF (this is net 
transfer to domestic producers because we are using the demand curve for imports, not importables). Against this, we must 
count the recycled tariff revenue P1ABPw. Of this, PTACPF is transferred from domestic consumers to domestic taxpayers and 
PFCBPw is transferred from foreign producers to domestic taxpayers. The net gain (AFE) from the tariff is thus seen to equal the 
excess of area PFCPPw (the terms of trade gain) over area AEC (the domestic deadweight loss). The optimal tariff is such that 
the marginal gain from the terms of trade improvement associated with a small tariff increase equals the marginal loss via 
domestic costs. In particular, the optimal tariff must be less than the prohibitive tariff (the tariff that eliminates imports) because 
a small reduction of the tariff below the prohibitive level involves no terms-of-trade loss (because imports are zero) but yields a 
gain by reducing the domestic distortion cost of the tariff; accordingly, the economy must gain by reducing the tariff below the 
prohibitive level (Vousden, 1990: 86). 
Supply and Demand were assumed to effectively exclude the possibility that the export supply of the foreign country 
may be non-unique for some prices (note that negative optimal tariff implies import subsidy). As has been shown in the example 
above, much of the welfare gains or losses arising from the imposition of a tariff depend on the elasticity of export supply. The 
more inelastic the export supply is, the greater the potential gains. Unfortunately, for African countries with supply response 
problems, the gains do not accrue [see Soludo, 1997]. We have confined our attention to impact effects. A tariff imposed by the 
home country may have significant effects on income distribution in the foreign country. If such redistributions reduce the 
foreign supply of exports, shifting SS to the left, then the home country's marginal cost of imports will be increased. If such an 
effect outweighs the other gains from a p.ositive tariff, then the home country would have done better by imposing an import 
subsidy. 
Finally, we note that although an individual large country can make itself better off by imposing its optimal tariff, the 
welfare of the world as a whole will be reduced by such an action (Vousden, 1990: 86). A feature of world trade models with a 
limited number of 'countries' is that the terms of trade effects become significant and optimal tariffs are much higher than in 
national partial equilibrium models, where terms of trade effects are often assumed to be zero. Neither extreme is fully 
convincing, but it is difficult to make plausible estimates of world price changes (Pomfret, 1997: 288). 
Source: Baldwin, 1992: 807 - 810 
In particular, Panagariya (1996) argues that because import demand elasticities are usually 
different across commodities, optimal revenue raising tariffs will be non-uniform. The tariff 
structure that shall maximize welfare and minimize deadweight costs to the domestic economy 
must recommend higher taxes on low-elasticity goods than those on higher elasticity goods. The 
optimum revenue-tariff structure will now involve high tariffs on goods where the elasticity of 
import demand is low — so that little distortion is caused by a tariff- and low tariffs on goods 
where the elasticity of import demand is high. 1or each dollar raised in revenue, the movement 
away from the optimum is less for goods with low elasticity than those with high elasticity. 
Therefore, it makes sense to introduce a proportionately larger tariff distortion in the case of 
goods with lower import-demand elasticity than in the latter case where the elasticity of import 
demand is high. This is indeed the essence of the well-known Ramsey (1927) result, which states 
that when lump sum taxes are not available, revenue-raising taxes should be levied in inverse 
proportibn to the elasticity of demand. 
Proponents of uniform tariffs argue that a uniform tariff is the least distortionary instrument 
for achieving the protection objective. A uniform nominal tariff, applying equally to final goods 
and inputs, results in an equal ad valorem subsidy to value added in import-competing sectors. 
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Simply put, a uniform tariff leads to equal effective protection across all import-competing 
sectors. 
Although a justification for a uniform tariff relies on practical difficulties in determining 
the true optimal structure of tariffs, opponents of uniform tariffs are quick to point out at least 
four major problems with these plausible-sounding conclusions. First, if some import-competing 
sectors use one or more exportables or nontradables as inputs, a uniform nominal tariff fails to 
equalize effective protection across sectors. "If exportables were never inputs in importable 
production, a uniform nominal tariff would automatically lead to a uniform effective tariff, 
otherwise precise uniformity in both could not be attained, and some distortion would be 
inevitable" (Corden, 1997:45). No tax is paid on exportables and nontradables used as inputs. 
Therefore, a uniform nominal tariff protects the value added in sectors using exportables or 
nontradables as inputs more than in other sectors. The marginal cost of protection is higher in the 
former than the latter sectors. The cost of providing the same overall protection to value added 
can be reduced by applying a lower nominal tariff on sectors using exportables and nontradables 
as inputs and higher nominal tariff on other sectors. 
Second, if one or more imported inputs are used in some exportables or nontradables, a 
uniform effective rate of protection no longer minimizes the distortion cost of protecting value 
added in import-competing sectors. In addition to creating the desired distortion, i.e., a uniform 
effective protection in import-competing sectors, the uniform tariff now also distorts production 
in exportable and no tradable sectors using imported inputs. Lowering the tariffs on inputs used 
in exportables and nontradables and raising them on inputs used exclusively in import-competing 
sectors can reduce the distortion cost. This will shift the distortion away from where it is not 
desired (exportables and nontradables) towards where it is desired (import-competing goods). 
Where the possibility of duty drawback is allowed, a duty drawback is itself a violation of the 
uniform tariff rule. 
Third, tariffs distort not merely production but also consumption. If we assume that no 
imported inputs are used in exportables or nontradables and no exportables and nontradables are 
used in the production of import-competing goods, a uniform nominal tariff will coincide with 
uniform effective protection and, moreover, minimize the distortion in production. Yet, it will not 
minimize the overall cost of the protection objective. Since the by-product distortion in 
consumption is not desired, overall protecting the goods with inelastic consumption demand 
more than others can lower distortion costs. This change will increase the distortion cost in 
production, lower it in consumption, and up to a point lower it overall. Uniform tariffs--whether 
nominal or effective--are non-optimal. 
Finally, if tariff evasion is possible via smuggling, even if the conditions for a uniform 
nominal tariff to be optimal are satisfied, its adoption will fail to yield the optimum. Not all 
goods can be smuggled with equal ease: automobiles are far more difficult to hide in a suitcase 
than wristwatches. A uniform nominal tariff on the books will translate into a non-uniform 
nominal tariff in practice. 
Indeed, trade taxes are not optimal instruments to achieve a revenue objective because they 
significantly distort production and consumption choices. The question most frequently asked is 
rather whether tariffs, rather than taxes, should be used to raise revenue. Preferred instruments to 
raise revenue are taxes such as income taxes or commodity taxes (excise, VAT, etc) (Panagariya, 
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1996). These are preferred taxes because, since they are applied neutrally to domestically 
produced and imported goods, they impose less distortion or inefficiency costs. The use of tariffs 
to raise revenue presupposes that other trade-neutral tax instruments are not available or cannot 
be used beyond existing levels; in other words, domestic taxes have to be taken as given either 
because the tax base cannot be enlarged rapidly enough or the marginal costs of increased 
domestic tax collection are very high (Mitra, 1992). 
Assuming total revenue is to be raised from tariffs alone, what tariff structure will minimize 
the distortion costs of raising this revenue? Panagariya (1996) opines; "clearly, the tariffs that 
move the economy the least from the free trade equilibrium while raising the required revenue 
will do the trick". Where we take a decision to raise tariffs as given and make the small country 
assumptions that there are many importable goods, many tariff rates, no domestic divergences 
and collection costs per dollar of revenue raised are same for all tariffs, what would the optimum 
tariff be? Corden (1997:54) argues that if (a) the elasticity of supply of exportables and of 
domestic demand for exportables are zero and if (b) taxation had no disincentive effects, with the 
elasticity of supply of effort zero, tariffs would not distort the production or consumption pattern 
relative to exportables or leisure, and the only distortion possible would be in the pattern of 
production and consumption of importables. In that instance, the optimum tariff structure would 
be a uniform tariff. 
4. Is there an optimal tariff for African countries? 
Given the premises outlined in previous sections, we intend to examine the question of 
optimal tariff formulation for African countries in the light of existing socio-economic situations 
in the region. We consider propositions for tariff rates in regional integration arrangements (and 
indeed for individual countries with respect to estimated impacts of different tariff rates on 
economic welfare, political economy considerations, export supply response and increased 
protectionism among industrial countries. 
a. Location of the optimal tariff: allocative and distributional considerations 
One of the most structural arguments against the prescription of optimal tariff for African 
counties is the ambiguity surrounding the location of such tariff rate. In identifying the puzzles in 
trade policy reforms, Soludo and Ogbu (2002:22-24) noted that the first ambiguity about tariff 
reforms is the location of the optimal level. In their view, tariff levels "should be a function of the 
level of development and should also be sensitive to government fiscal position, balance of 
payments, infant industry consideration. Thus, the key empirical question pertains to the level of 
tariffs and trade restrictions that are consistent with given country specific conditions". The 
yardstick that matters is the degree to which trade reform contributes to the construction of a 
high-quality institutional environment at home (Rodrik, 2000). In a classic and most lucid 
presentation of the problem, Rodrik (1998: 191) used a computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model and simulated the potential aggregate and distributional consequences of trade policy 
reforms in an archetypical African economy using different tariff rates. It was observed that a 
reduction from 40% to 20% yields an income gain of about 2.0%, but reducing further from 20% 
to zero yields only an additional gain of 0.8% (see Table 1 below). He showed that tariff reform 
entails a redistribution of income among various sectors of the economy. Using a hypothetical 
reduction of tariff from 40% to 30%, 20%, 10%, and 0%, he showed the distributional impact of 
trade liberalization on farmers, informal-sector workers, urban workers, urban employers, and 
recipients of revenues that derive from trade restrictions. Following the simulations he conducted, 
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he discovered that tariff reductions from 40% to 10% may increase real incomes by 2.5% and 
further reductions to 0% causes aggregate real income to increase by 2.8%. The distributional 
consequences of the reforms are even more dramatic as "the magnitudes of the distributional 
impacts are very large." As shown in the table below, there are clear losers and gainers from 
reforms. A scenario as reduction from 40% (t=0.4) to 10% (t=0. 1) has farmers and informal 
sector workers as gainers. For the farmers, they have a real income gain of 19.95% and informal 
sector workers have 19.78%. In this scenario, urban employers incur a real income loss of 
34.59%, while recipients of quota rents suffer a loss of 40.74%. Unfortunately, the net gain to the 
economy is 2.54% which is far less in order of magnitude than the negative distributional impacts 
and thus confirms that "efficiency consequences of trade reform pale in comparison to its 
redistributive effects ... most significant is that they entail so much redistribution relative to their 
efficiency benefits - a point that is surely not lost on those whose incomes are at stake", and 
explains why trade and price reforms in Africa "tend to have high political cost-benefit ratios" 
(Rodnk, 1998:191). 
Table 1: Distributional Implications of Trade Reform in an Archetypal African Economy 













Real National income 1.574 ] 100 1.08 1.97 2.54 2.80 
Real income by group 
Farmers 0.431 27 6.26 12.76 19.95 27.61 
Urbanemployers 0.133 8 -12.03 -23.31 -34.59 -45.11 
Informal sector 
workers 
0.647 41 6.18 12.67 19.78 27.51 




0.054 3 5.56 -5.56 -40.74 -100.00 
Informal wages 1.043 -1.92 -3.84 -5.47 -6.90 
Urban Wages 1.217 -1.97 -3.78 -5.51 -6.98 
Output of Rural 
Sector 
1.233 3.08 6.08 8.84 11.52 
Output of Urban 
sector 
0.361 -7.76 -15.79 -24.10 -32.69 
Employment in rural 
sector 
0.709 5.22 10.30 15.23 19.89 
Employment in Urban 
sector 
0.291 -12.71 -25.09 -37.11 -48.45 
Consumption of urban 
goods 
0.5 14 5.84 12.06 18.68 25.88 
Volume of Imports 0.153 37.91 77.78 119.61 164.05 
Source: Rodrik, 1998:190 
The puzzle is that after these kinds of recognitions accorded to 'particular circumstances' in 
determining the level of tariffs, analysts mechanically jump to prescribing 'magical numbers' 
which have typically ranged from 15% to 40% as the 'desired' level of tariffs for Africa. Much of 
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the empirical literature seems to be settling with a suggestion of tariff bands in multiples of 5 such 
as: 5, 10, 15, and 20. How these magic numbers are derived remains an open empirical question1. 
How they arrived at such numbers is any one's guess. The bold question is how an African policy 
maker knows when tariff reduction has gone below the revenue maximizing level. In fact, in the 
face of their consternation and dismay, they wondered loudly, "Could it not, in fact, be that 
several African countries have liberalized beyond the level that is optimal given their objective 
conditions? Liberalization beyond the optimal level could be a major source of instability such as 
persistent balance of payments and fiscal crisis. Even some neoclassical trade theorists recognize 
that the optimality of zero tariffs as prescribed by theory may not always hold. 
b. Export Supply Response and Optimal Tariff in Africa 
While part of the theoretical conditions for optimal tariff setting and operationalization is 
that the setting countries have monopsonistic powers in import demand or monopolistic powers 
in export supply, price responsiveness in the manufacturing sector of many African countries is 
weak. Available statistics show that the average armual growth rate of imports, 1991-2001 for 
SSA countries was 4.8%. Eastern Europe and central Asia was 2.5%; industrial countries in 
general were 6.9% disaggregated data shows that imports from SSA countries are particularly 
insignificant. The poorest countries in Africa have manufacturing sectors whose price 
responsiveness is close to zero, which explains why manufactured exports to the European Union 
under the Lome convention have not been dynamic (Pomfret, 1997:305). 
Undeniably, there are a number of internal and external constraints to export growth and 
diversification in Africa. According to Laird (1997), these include Competitiveness of production 
(including labor and other production costs, domestic price controls), Capacity constraints 
especially the availability and cost of finance for investment in plant and machinery, State- 
trading companies, including marketing board, and other state-owned enterprises that may have 
monopoly rights or have access to financial and other resources, crowding out private sector 
initiatives, and effectiveness of competition policy. Others include price controls and price 
support systems, which constrain the transmission of world prices into the domestic market, 
infrastructural bottlenecks, and the outward orientation of entrepreneurship, lack of labor with 
specific skills needed in export industries; inadequate health, safety or standards regulations and 
testing affecting production or sale of goods produced; and finally institutional constraints on the 
development and application of good trade policy and practices. Evidently, the major problems to 
African export performance are principally domestic. Only 23 percent of Africa's low-income 
population lives in countries with a minimally adequate environment for growth, while more than 
85 percent of the countries have rudimentary industrial infrastructure: (Soludo, 1998: 297). 
The origin of these magical numbers may be traced to the unequal treaties of the l9" and the early 20th centuries. 
These treaties (in which the weaker countries had little tariff autonomy) almost always imposed 5% uniform tariff 
rates on the weaker countries. Once 5% became the focal point, people began to think in multiples of that. As yet, no 
one has been able to demonstrate the theoretical or empirical basis for such numbers. Furthermore, Sachs-Warner 
index of openness had the benchmark of 40%--- above which is distorting and below which is relatively non- 
distorting. By that logic, it is not clear what the net benefits of further lowering of tariffs below the 40% would be 
vis-â-vis the possible costs. In other words, there is no basis yet to propound an iron law of tariffs that everywhere 
and always an average tariff of 5% should be preferred to 6%. 
-10- 
c. Government Revenue and Balance of Payments Considerations in Tariff 
Setting 
A sore point in the determination of tariff rates and meeting commitments to regional 
common external tariff arrangements is the expected impact of tariff changes (in particular tariff 
reduction) on government revenue and balance of payments. Government revenue and balance of 
payments effects work in two offsetting channels. First, given the low productive base in most 
developing countries, lower tariffs imply higher imports, which have to be paid for. On the other 
hand, while government loses revenue on account of lower tariff rates, higher import volumes 
may offset this loss. 
Whether it be revenue loss or balance of payments problems, these introduce distortions 
into any liberalizing economy. The capacity to minimize these distortions depends, for most 
developing countries, on their ability to attract offsetting foreign capital that could pay for either 
the lost revenue or offset the balance of payments disequilibrium. Given the currently high tariff 
rates in most developing countries, optimal tariff recommendations often equates to tariff 
reduction. Such reductions are often not very appealing given the high level of dependence of 
many developing countries on tariff as a major source of public revenue. 
Conceptualization of optimality does not explicitly account for the expected shocks arising 
from major changes in the government revenue of developing nations (under the prevalent 
conditions of undiversified revenue base). Is 0.15 tax rate more optimal for a country than 0.20 in 
terms of revenue yield? One fact that is likely to emerge in the discussion of tariff optimality in 
many developing countries is that for a region, there is not likely to be any rate that maximizes 
revenue for all nations at the same time. The adoption of any rate therefore will necessitate the 
design of compensation mechanism that would offset or at least reduce the losses by states that 
lose revenue. From a practical standpoint, this is very difficult, if not impossible.2 Besides, there 
is no one tariff rate that is revenue maximizing. In the views of Panagariya (1996), import 
demand elasticity differs across commodities; therefore optimal revenue raising tariffs will be 
non-uniform. 
The same discussion applies to balance of payments consideration. The likelihood of even 
obtaining imports elasticities coefficients of about the same rates in any two industries in 
developing countries is slim and unlikely. Much less is it likely to obtain uniform elasticity for 
any two countries in any industry. As such, considerations of optimality in the design of tariff 
schemes (for regional integration arrangements) will have to consider the likely import surge that 
these countries are going to face and the implications of such surge for balance of payments. 
Already, many developing countries are under huge debt burden and struggling to balance their 
books annually. In the face of shrinking export opportunities, dwindling world output growth rate 
and rigidities in the production of exportables, the prescription of 'optimal tariff rates' would. 
only be mechanical if it were not able to incorporate (on a country by country basis) the likely 
shocks that would arise from the application of such tariff rates on imports structure and 
consequently the balance of payments. 
2 Rodrik (1998: 186) argues that 'in a typical African country, compensating the losers from trade liberalization is 
impossible for all practical purposes—the amount of redistribution required will more than eat up the efficiency 
gains generated by the reform'. 
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d. Increased Protectionism, Domestic Price Supports and Tariff escalation 
among Industrial Countries 
While negotiations proceed under the WTO, a worrisome tendency among industrial 
countries in recent years is the increasing protection for many primary sectors like agriculture in 
the form of increased tariffs and subsidies. This is relevant for developing countries' trade 
policies for two reasons. First, most of the products in which these protections are highest also 
'coincide' with the major export products of a number of developing countries thus reducing 
competitiveness of these weaker countries in the same products and raises the stakes of their 
exports. Japan recently placed a tariff of 490% on agricultural products while cotton subsidies to 
farmers in developed countries amount to $3.9 billion. These subsidies are three times U.S. 
foreign aid to Africa. Liberalization of the groundnut market would increase profits in the five 
major African producers by $124 million annually. On per capita basis, a Japanese cow is 
subsidized by $7.90 a day while its European counterpart receives $2.90 per day. At the same 
time, over 75% of SSA citizens live on less than $1 a day. Generally, the over $1 billion a day in 
subsidy to farmers by industrial countries continues to be a pain in the neck for many developing 
countries that produce and export agricultural products. These situations are worsened by the 
increasing tariff escalation. While raw cocoa faces virtually a zero tariff in the European Union 
and Japan, final products made of cocoa face tariffs of 30.6 percent and 21.7 percent respectively, 
making diversification up the product chain difficult. Tariff escalation often works against efforts 
to increase domestic processing in developing countries. It reduces the incentive for adding value 
in developing countries. While tariff escalation is a feature of almost all economies and tariff 
structures (see Table 2 in the Appendix), high tariffs are particularly frequent for agricultural 
imports in OECD countries (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001:153) 
The most restrictive industrial country trade barriers are imposed on developing country 
products (Ray and Marvel, 1984). Evidence has shown, that the manufactured goods, which face 
the highest (peak) tariffs in industrial countries are exactly those goods in which developing 
countries have a comparative advantage. Tariffs on many consumer, agricultural, and labor- 
intensive products are 10-20 times higher than the overall average tariff. For example, U.S. 
import tariffs on clothes and shoes average 11 percent and go as high as 48 percent. Other 
industrial economies are no different. The European Union (EU) applies tariffs of up to 236 
percent on meat, 180 percent on cereals, and 17 percent on sneakers. In contrast, its tariffs on raw 
materials and electronics rarely exceed 5 percent (Gresser, 2002). 
The import of the above situation is highly distorted incentive system against exportation of 
processed products and highly reduced market access for exports of developing countries. But 
more important in the context of this discussion is the political economy implication of such 
actions as further liberalization is being foisted on developing countries. There is a perception 
problem here as the countries worry about reducing their tariffs when protection in industrialized 
countries is getting stiffer. 
Besides, excessive protection in industrial countries reduces market access and tends to 
inhibit growth in developing country industries, and works against the maximization of the 
dynamic gains of trade openness. Apparel is a particularly critical example, where the 
combination of non-tariff and tariff barriers tends to raise the average US price of a garment by 
about 34% (USITC, 2001). While the non-tariff barriers on industrial country apparel imports are 
supposed to be removed by 2005, there is grave concern that industrial countries may back away 
from this commitment, leaving market access cxtremely limited and distorted. With respect to 
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non-agricultural products, the WTO Declaration commits "... to negotiations which shall aim.. .to 
reduce or as appropriate eliminate tariffs, including the reduction or elimination of tariff peaks, 
high tariffs, and tariff escalation, as well as non-tariff barriers, in particular on products of export 
interest to developing countries." (WTO, 2001, par. 16). Recommendations of optimal tariffs for 
developing countries (on the premise of liberalized trade regimes in these countries or regions) 
presume that these barriers are corrected and the market access is first assured for their limited 
products in the industrial markets. In addition, these trade policies damage developing country 
agricultural exports. EU trade barriers and internal price supports have generated excess 
production for many goods, which are major exports of poor countries. In many cases, excess 
output has been dumped on global markets, significantly reducing the prices poor countries 
receive for these products. It is precisely these sorts of policies that prevent the benefits of freer 
trade from accruing to the poorer nations and as a number of African countries are net suppliers 
of agricultural products, the effect of these barriers is a reduction in their real incomes. 
e. Complementary Measures 
In addition to the facts of the previous subsections, a number of other complementary 
policies that strengthen tariff policies have to be in place if low tariffs in developing countries are 
to have any impact. These include the usual complements to effective trade liberalization like 
secure and enforceable property rights and regulatory institutions. Recommendations of optimal 
tariffs are based on the assumption that trade liberalization will lead to greater growth. However, 
these factors have the tendency of structurally inhibiting the transmission of trade policy benefits 
into real growth. It has been severalily argued that the establishment of secure and stable property 
rights has been a key element in the rise of the West and the onset of modern economic growth 
(Rodrik, 2000). On the other hand, regulatory institutions are necessary to hedge against 
pervasive market failures in many developing countries. Discussions about tariff rates that 
promote growth become sterile in the absence of effective regulatory institutions. Thus, whether 
in the context of regional integration arrangements or individual country bases, priority items in 
institutional and trade policy promotion involves regulatory institutions and effective property 
rights. 
At the practical level, the arguments for a diverse tariff structure rest on the ability of 
governments to: (i) "pick the winners," that is to identify the candidates that are most likely meet 
the conditions justifying intervention, and choose and maintain the appropriate level for the 
policy variable (tariff, subsidy); (ii) be immune to the pressures from vested groups that 
inevitably arise once the willingness to grant special status is established; and (iii) prevent any 
protection granted from becoming permanent. The empirical evidence in developing countries 
during the past three decades casts doubt on most governments' ability to meet these conditions. 
While this theoretical argument is valid, in practice one can think of no product where African 
nations possess sufficient monopsony power for this to be relevant. Such products must be such 
that the share of world imports must be large. Then, the actual tariffs in Africa are typically larger 
than the values optimal tariffs could reasonably be expected to take. For all practical purposes, 
tariff policy in Africa can be established without reference to this basically theoretical issue. 
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5. Policy Implications and the Road Ahead 
There is also a broad consensus that for policy purposes, the broad generalizations about 
the benefits or otherwise of 'openness' are unhelpful. There is a need to unpack the openness 
principle into the component elements. The same argument goes for optimal tariff. Broad based 
prescriptions of optimal tariff are unlikely to be 'optimal' for any two countries operating under 
different economic conditions. All the analyses in the preceding sections aim to make the point 
that optimal tariff structures for developing countries are unlikely to work. This is so on the two 
broad levels of analyses — the conceptual and practical. 
On the conceptual level, while there is agreement on the need for lowering of tariffs and the 
impact of trade liberalization on growth, there is little agreement on even whether this tariff 
structure should be uniform or differentiated. Arguments for uniform tariff based on the 
simplicity of application and the problems associated with collection overlook the revenue and 
balance of payments implications of such uniform tariff structure given varying imports 
elasticities. On the other hand, arguments regarding differentiated tariff structure have not dealt 
with the problems of collection and administration of the tariff. Besides, whether differentiated or 
uniform, optimal tariff arguments are yet to address the issue of the location of such optimal rate. 
From Rodrik's calculations, 'low' is helpful, but 'too low' could be harmful. In the literature, the 
optimal tariff for a developing country is zero. But this is impracticable given revenue and other 
macroeconomic implications of such a rate. 
Particularly for African countries, there are further questions regarding export supply 
response. Is it really possible to speak of an African uniform tariff where the elasticity of supply of 
exportable is zero? Is there a uniform nominal tariff that would avoid distortion of the 
consumption pattern, a uniform effective tariff that would avoid distortion of the production 
pattern, etc? Policy economists, frustrated by the complexities of trade policy regimes in most 
developing countries, find the replacement of all trade restrictions by a single uniform tariff as 
the most effective instrument of minimizing trade policy distortions. To them, optimal structures 
are too complex to be of practical value. Optimal trade policy for a small open economy is 
complete free trade. Another justification for a uniform tariff given by policy economists is 
transparency and administrative simplicity. A complex tariff structure may rise with the 
complexity of the tariff code. A uniform tariff leaves no room for misclassification of goods for 
evasion of tariffs. Customs officials can concentrate on ensuring that the value of the good is not 
understated; there can be no dispute concerning the rate of tariff to be paid. These factors can 
help reduce delays in clearing goods for delivery and generate gains especially when goods are to 
be used in the production of exports. 
But the fact remains that there is no simple structure. While trade liberalization must not be 
discouraged, a blanket prescription could be unhelpful in resolving the myriad of structural problems 
that face trade openness and the use of trade instruments to improve economic welfare in developing 
countries. As such, the recommendation is that the recommendation of tariff rates will depend on the 
peculiarities of the country involved. Country macroeconomic frameworks differ to a large extent. 
This is so even in a regional integration setting. Prescriptions of tariff rates for regional integration 
arrangements have to consider the individual country circumstances. in particular, there should 
be at least a study in each case to determine the tariff level/levels compatible with the particular 
macroeconomic specificities of the liberalizing developing country. 
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But also important, probably even more important is the place of complementary measures 
to be put in place in the adoption and administration of any tariff. Optimality of a tariff rate at any 
point in time could in fact be determined by the existence or otherwise of these complementary 
measures. In the context of a regional integration, such complementary measures will of course 
include the structure of compensation available for countries that are likely to lose from the 
implementation of a (possibly low) optimal tariff. If optimality is defined in terms of reducing 
distortions to domestic production and consumption while leading to greater trade, then for many 
African countries, with weak revenue base, the size and structure of compensation could be 
decisive in determining the optimal tariff rate. 
At the country level, some of the complementary measures include the usual menu — ports 
reforms, institutional base for implementing trade and related policies, productive infrastructure, 
human capital development etc. For a number of African countries, functionality of the ports could 
be more important than deciding on tariff rates. Improvement in the efficiency of collection of tariff 
revenue could indeed dwarf the problems associated with revenue loss owing to reductions in the 
tariff rates. While this may not solve all the problems, especially those associated with high import 
elasticities and which could impinge on the balance of payments, at least reforming the ports would 
have solved some part of both the revenue and balance of payments problems. 
Infant industry protection remains a major problem in trade policy design in many 
developing countries. Mandani and Ollareaga (2002) provide a political economy analysis of the 
difficulties of liberalizing tariffs in Egypt. Using the political economy methodology, they 
identified products and sectors where tariff cuts will be politically costly and areas where it will 
improve resource allocation and efficiency. The weight of the problem may vary from country to 
country, but it is present in every developing economy — and indeed in many industrial countries 
as demonstrated by the recent rise in tariff war in industrial countries. Whether the optimal tariff 
will be uniform or differentiated, it has to take into account the development of industries that are 
being nurtured by the state. Compensation is hardly very effective in this regard; years of grace 
for growing such industries may be better options for effective harmonization in a regional 
integration arrangement. 
To end this treatise, we reiterate the point made severally that the use of magical numbers 
and the blanket prescriptions of such numbers for developing countries' tariffs (especially in the 
context of regional integration) do not help much. There is little alternative to country case 
studies and regional assessments of the losses that could accrue to integrating countries in the 
event of the application of such tariff rates. Particularly, it is important to note that optimal tariff 
rates will differ from region to region. While a regional integration could get participating 
countries to fall in line with a particular rate on the basis of known impacts, it is more difficult to 
implement such uniform rates across regions. 
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Figure 2: What is an Optimal Tariff 
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Table 2: Tariff Escalation in Developing and Industrial Countries, 1994-2000 (unweighted 
average in %) 
PT 
Pw 
MT MF Imports 
Region Country Year 
Agricultural Product Industrial Product 
1St Stage Semi-Proc Fully Proc 1St Stage Semi-Proc Fully Proc 
1 China 1997 19.3 34.3 29.2 7.4 13.3 19.3 
1 Fiji 1996 .. .. .. 5.0 10.0 22.5 
1 Indonesia 1998 4.7 4.4 13.9 3.8 7.9 11.6 
1 Korea 1999 49.9 93.2 31.8 3.4 7.8 8.0 
1 Malaysia /b 1997 .. .. .. 1.0 7.0 11.9 
1 Philippines 1998 14.3 20.3 23.2 3.5 7.1 11.1 
1 Solomon Islands /b 1998 .. .. .. 29.0 15.4 25.6 
1 Thailand /a 1999 43.5 48.0 38.0 .. .. .. 
2 Bangladesh /a 1999 16.1 23.0 29.2 17.6 20.7 24.1 
2 India 1997 25.4 29.9 42.8 23.6 35.4 36.4 
2 Sri Lanka /b 1994 30.0 .. 40.0 20.0 15.6 22.5 
3 BurkinaFaso Ia/b 1997 31.8 32.6 33.4 28.5 35.7 29.0 
3 Cameroon Ia/b 1994 23.9 23.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 21.0 
3 Cote dIvoire 1994 .. .. .. 18.1 21.6 26.2 
3 Guinea /a 1998 17.4 18.5 18.1 16.8 16.6 16.1 
3 Kenya /a 1999 16.4 24.7 24.7 15.2 17.9 18.6 
3 Madagascar 1998 4.9 8.3 7.6 1.1 6.7 7.7 
3 Mali 1999 14.5 15.2 18.0 4.7 7.4 12.8 
3 Nigeria /b 1999 25.0 24.0 31.G 
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3 South Africa Ia/b 1997 12.4 10.9 15.6 4.9 18.6 13.8 
3 Tanzania Ia/b 1999 18.5 25.0 23.0 13.3 13.3 18.3 

























4.8 2.8 11.2 
24.3 32.3 26.8 
33.0 36.9 44.5 
12.0 7.0 24.5 
2.5 6.4 9.3 
48.0 51.6 83.0 
35.4 33.7 43.0 
35.1 43.7 64.7 
5.0 6.2 9.0 
0.8 5.6 4.6 
24.2 29.5 39.5 
12.8 4.1 8.4 
5.4 7.3 8.5 
22.0 35.6 30.3 
32.0 31.3 34.6 






















20.1 26.3 32.3 
4.9 16.4 18.6 
20.8 39.4 39.1 
8.0 18.9 17.5 
16.5 22.5 44.9 
57.9 110.0 158.4 
4.6 15.4 17.3 
8.4 12.8 17.3 
0.6 4.6 5.6 
2.6 5.8 8.8 
1.1 1.3 3.4 
5.6 9.8 11.2 
25.9 16.9 17.1 





































10.0 13.9 16.0 
22.7 16.9 18.4 
9.5 13.2 15.6 
12.8 17.7 18.6 
10.4 13.0 23.8 
12.5 16.8 18.5 
15.1 14.9 30.5 
9.6 13.3 12.4 
9.9 13.4 15.5 
13.9 14.6 15.6 
.. .. .. 
10.1 14.0 15.9 
7.7 12.0 15.3 
11.0 6.9 13.8 
8.9 11.9 15.8 
6.9 9.6 12.2 
2.7 3.7 6.6 
6.7 9.4 12.5 
8.2 10.2 14.2 
2.7 3.6 5.9 
7.8 11.0 11.4 
12.1 13.1 13.0 
15.0 2.2 11.1 





















LDCs (60) average 












0.3 0.7 2.3 
1.7 3.6 7.0 
7.3 12.0 13.1 
2.0 9.0 11.5 
4.5 14.3 15.5 
0.5 2.7 2.8 
14.8 0.0 3.5 
4.6 30.5 41.8 
7.1 4.5 10.3 
17.9 23.2 27.7 
4.8 8.6 12.0 
0.7 5.6 6.5 
0.7 4.2 5.1 
0.6 4.9 4.0 
4.0 0.9 5.? 
0.6 4.5 3.5 
0.3 2.1 5.4 
0.0 1.6 3.4 
21.6 4.0 8.5 
0.6 5.0 4.1 
10.7 11.9 15.5 
3.2 3.6 5.1 
Notes: /a Tariff escalation of agricultural products is based on food processing only. 
/b Tariff escalation of industrial products is based on all goods. 
Sources: WTO CD ROM 2000 and WTO Trade Policy Review, various issues, 1995-2000. 
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